This paper examines the impact of the subscription-calling rate structure on the demand for residential telephone network subscription and calling. Stated-preference experimental data are used to estimate demand equations.
Introduction
The Australian telecommunications subscription-calling rate structure has developed in a monopolistic environment.
Cross-subsidies in the rate structure have contributed to pressure for a competing telecommunications carrier to encourage the market provision of an optimal (efficient) rate structure. ' A major problem for carriers in designing optimal rate structures is that little is known of consumer subscription-calling response to changes in prices.
Previous studies of residential telephone demand (Mitchell, 1978; Pacey, 1983; Park et al., 1983; Taylor and Kridel, 1990) After specifying the conditional demands the respondent then indicates whether household network subscription is maintained at the experimental line rental charge. The paper is organised as follows. The received telephone demand theory is described and extended to the vector case in Section 2. In Section 3, the estimable model and econometric method are specified. Section 4 provides a description of the stated-preference data generation method and the survey procedures.
A discussion of the estimation results is provided in Section 5.
The model
The demand for telephone network subscription and calling is jointly determined.
In this section the received theory (Squire, 1973 ) is extended to the individual choice of subscription level and calling portfolio. An ' On 8 November 1990 the Australian Government announced its decision to establish a private sector competitor (Optus Communications) to a merged TelecomiOTC (AOTC) in the provision of network facilities. ' Several recent attempts model the demand for residential service choice and the demand for local calling use cross-sectional micro-level survey data (e.g, Kling and Van Der Ploeg 1990; Atherton et al., 1990; Train et al., 1987) . econometrically testable model consistent with the extended formulation is specified by linking the model to a continuous/discrete choice framework.
Received theory
Consider a telephone network that serves an area populated by N households.
Each household faces a discrete network subscription decision and a choice of how many fixed price telephone calls to make. Assume household i utility is a function of the number of calls made (4) and amount of other goods (x) consumed,
where q takes the value 0 (no network subscription) or >O (single line rental network subscription) and x is an n-dimensional vector. Utility is assumed strictly quasi-concave in q and x. Because the subscription choice can involve a corner solution, the problem is formulated as a two-stage process. The household is assumed to select a subscription alternative.
Values of q and x are then chosen to maximise (1) subject to the household budget constraint,
where p is a vector of prices for other goods, r is the line rental (subscription) fee, p, is the price per call and yi is household i money income. The parameter 6 = 1 if the household subscribes to the network; 6 = 0 otherwise.3
The utility maximisation problem for any household implies a maximum value of the subscription fee rT that leaves the household indifferent as to whether to subscribe.
Solving explicitly for rT,
provides the subscription reservation-price function for household i. Assuming that free subscription is preferred to no network access, 0 < rf 6 y,. (CI, is homogeneous of degree one in p, p, and y, under the assumption that uI( p, p,, y, -rT) is homogeneous of degree zero. Suppose rT varies according to some probability density h(rT). If r is the single line rental subscription fee then household i subscribes if and only if rT Z= r. Denote N,, the number of telephone subscribers in the population. 
Further, assume the distribution of reservation prices is log rr = 4(p, P,, 7) + q ,
where E: is distributed extreme value with mean equal 0 and variance equal CT*.~ Then log rT is distributed CT*. The probability density is logistic with mean $(p, p,, Y) and variake
y)]lr and r = V?lrr. With subscription fee r where Z* = [log rT -4(p, p,, charged, the penetration rate is n = prob (rT 3 r)
where Z = [log r -4(p, P,, 9)1/r.
Received theory: an extension
The received theory establishes the interdependence of telephone network subscription and calling demand in that household subscription-calling decisions are influenced by both the price per call and the line rental charge. However, the choice set is unduly restricted.
Here the choice set is expanded in two ways. The maximum attainable utility for alternative j in J is given by ui, = u,j (P,> Y, -rj, z:, SY, w,j) .
The household selects alternative j if and only if
The corresponding choice probability for alternative j is P, = Prob[uij(p,, yi -r,, zy, sp, wij) (10) To specify closed-form probabilities requires that indirect utility is partitioned as follows:
where ejj = ei, [wI,(zy, sy) ]. uj, is the representative indirect utility of household i for alternative j.' With e,, distributed extreme value, the closed-form subscription probabilities are logit in ui, such that 
The conditional demands in (13) depend both on observed and unobserved factors.
Econometric method
The subscription-calling demand system [( 12), (13) 
and implies that the calling demands obtained through (13) 
provides the call demands:
There is no variation in pi, pz" over (i, j), so household i ignores the value in comparing u,~ and uik. Therefore, the probability that household i subscribes j rental lines is,
where uij = qj + O,p, + /3,(yi -r,) + I,/J~,(z~, sp 
The associated log likelihood function, ~=CCY~jlnP(kIs,,e)+Clnp(S,)
for linear-in-parameters logit choice probabilities. McFadden (1974) proves ' The following distance-time calling bands are used for the empirical analysis: Day, O-10 km; Night, O-10 km; Day, lo-30 km; Night, lo-30 km; Day, 30-100 km; Night, 30-100 km; Economy, 30-100 km; Day, 100-800 km; Night, 100-800 km; Economy, 100-800 km; Day, Over 800 km; Night, Over 800 km; Economy, Over 800 km. The Over 800 km time zones are 8 am through 6 pm Monday through Saturday, 6 pm through 10 pm Monday through Friday and 10 pm through 8 am everyday and 6 pm Saturday through 8 am Monday, respectively. 
for all j, k in .I. The random error term in (a, t)th calling demand is decomposed, (27) where E(nf,I) = 0 and corre1(qf3', E(etXr( j = k)) = 0. ,=I For example, positive household demand for day calling to the Over 800 km calling band is reported for only 40 of the 700 cases.
Results
The telephone line-rental model provides the probability that a household will subscribe to the telephone network by renting a telephone line. The subscription probability, in (22) assumes the household has a binary choice of renting a line. The probability depends on factors that reflect the household's utility from telephone services and its ability to pay for the services. Socio household is aged between 45 and 54 years (HEAD4554), and the head of household is aged between 55 and 64 years (HEAD5564). The elasticities of the line-rental probability with respect to call-minute prices and income are provided in Table 2 below. The signs of the line rental probability elasticities for the call-minute prices are negative for nine of the call-minute prices. All the estimates are inelastic and small in magnitude. The positively signed calling income elasticities provided in Table 5 above are inelastic.
The negatively signed economy calling equations estimate supports the proposition that economy calls are regarded as an inferior good by subscribers.
Distance-time calling band Table 2 is positive as are most of the income elasticities for call-minute demand reported in Table 5 . This suggests continued growth in telecommunications demand in Australia as household incomes grow. The exceptional negative income elasticities for call-minute demand occur in the night and economy time periods, suggesting attempts to shift calling demand to off-peak times are hampered by income growth. Call-minute demand is generally inelastic with respect to own price in the estimates reported in Table 3 and Table 4 . An unregulated monopolist faced with inelastic demand would find it profitable to raise prices, This suggests some form of regulation or competition is required if prices are to be kept within the range covered by the survey questions, a range that brackets I6 The equations and order of the Ramsey test rejected are as follows: Night, O-10 km, second, third and fourth order terms; Economy, 30-100 km, third and fourth order terms; Day, 100-800 km, fourth order term; Night, 100-800 km, second, third and fourth order terms; Day, over 800 km, second and fourth order terms; Night, over 800 km, third and fourth order terms. 
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